Abstract-In secure multi-party computations (SMC), parties wish to compute a function on their private data without revealing more information about their data than what the function reveals. In this paper, we investigate two Shannon-type questions on this problem. We first consider the traditional one-shot model for SMC which does not assume a probabilistic prior on the data. In this model, private communication and randomness are the key enablers to secure computing, and we investigate a notion of randomness cost and capacity. We then move to a probabilistic model for the data, and propose a Shannon model for discrete memoryless SMC. In this model, correlations among data are the key enablers for secure computing, and we investigate a notion of dependency which permits the secure computation of a function. While the models and questions are general, this paper focuses on summation functions, and relies on polar code constructions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a group of m parties, each with a private bit x i , i ∈ [m] = {1, . . . , m}, which are interested in computing jointly a function f (x 1 , . . . , x m ), without revealing any other information (than what the function reveals) about their inputs to anybody else. For example, the parties want to vote between two candidates for presidency without revealing their vote, i.e., f (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = n i=1 x i . Can this be achieved? Note that we are asking here for an exact computation of the function f , with an arbitrary number of parties m (possibly low), and no information leakage. The latter requirement means that no additional information about the inputs must be shared than what would be shared in a model with a trusted party, which takes care of the computation. Hence, even in the case of a summation function, a noiseperturbation approach will not work in this framework. Of course, the above cannot be achieved without leveraging some "security primitive". With secure multi-party computations (SMC), this goal is achieved by assuming that the parties have access to private communication. The ideas of SMC were first introduced by Yao in [16] , in a two-party setup, in particular with the millionaire problem. General multiparty protocols were then obtained by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [8] for computational security, and by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [4] and by Chaum, Crépeau and Damgȧrd [5] for information-theoretic security, using in particular secretsharing [13] . This paper focuses on the latter setting.
Information-theoretic (IT) security does not rely on the computational power of the adversary, i.e., on hardness assumptions. The models and questions in IT SMC are however very different than the ones studied in the Shannon information theory models. In this paper, we consider the following problems. First, we consider a traditional model for SMC (with private communication, private access to randomness and honest-but-curious parties) and investigate a notion of randomness cost needed to compute a given function securely. Identifying the least amount of randomness is primarily a question which we find mathematically interesting and which connects to information theory subjects, in particular to the study of entropy vectors. It is however also a notion which captures the complexity of a function f for its secure computation 1 . In the second part of the paper, we propose a Shannon model for SMC, assuming the parties input to be drawn from a discrete memoryless source, and requiring the function computation and the security requirement to hold up to a vanishing error probability in an asymptotic regime. In this model, the correlation among the data can be leveraged to obtain secure computations. This model departs significantly from the traditional SMC models discussed above, on the other hand, it is defined in a similar setting as for traditional information theory problems such secrecy [2] , [11] , [6] or wire-tap channels [15] . Along these lines, a Shannon type model was recently proposed in [14] for a notion of "secure computation", which is however different than SMC and the notions discussed in this paper. In [14] , the parties wish to compute a function on their inputs using communication links which are eavesdropped, and the goal is to compute f without allowing an eavesdropper to compute it. This is different from our setting, where the communication links between parties are secured, and where the parties themselves are the eavesdropper toward one another. Other works relevant to our setting are the interactive source compression [10] and the compress and compute problems [9] , [12] , but again, these do not take into account the privacy of the inputs among the parties.
II. NOTATION
In what follows, [n] = {1, ..., n}, |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A, X n denotes a vector of length n and X i represents the i th element of the vector X n . For x ∈ {0, 1} n and S ∈ [n], x[S] = {x i : i ∈ S}. Finally, for two vectors X n and Y n , X n ⊕ Y n represents the component-wise XOR addition.
III. ONE-SHOT MODEL
In this section, secure multi-party computation protocols are studied in the one-shot setting, where the parties' inputs have no probabilistic prior (equivalently a uniform prior) and where the function computation is done once. 
and at even time t ∈ {2, 4, . . . , T − 1}, each party can transmit information to some other parties. Finally, we define the view of party P i from the protocol by
In SMCs, the notion of security is defined with the ideal vs. real model paradigm. In the ideal model, trusted parties provide securely their inputs to a trusted party which provides back securely the outputs to them. The real protocol is then deemed secure if any adversarial attack to the protocol has a counterpart that can be simulated in the ideal model. We refer to [7] for formal definitions. In this paper, we adopt the following information theoretic definitions. Definition 2. Let P 1 , . . . , P m denote m parties, where party
. For simplicity, the inputs are assumed to take values in F 2 = {0, 1}. We assume that X 1 , . . . , X m are independent and uniformly distributed 3 random variables. A protocol Π in the HCN model computes accurately and securely deterministic functions f 1 , . . . , f m (taking values in a discrete set) if 
Definition 3. We define the least amount of randomness that is required to compute accurately and securely functions
where the minimization is over all protocols Π in the HCN model which computes accurately and securely f 1 , . . . , f m .
Notice that ρ is invariant under the ordering of the functions. Note that all the f i may be the same.
A. The XOR function
In this section, we investigate the XOR function, and assume that one of the party computes the function. It can always send back the output to other parties in a final round of the protocol. The techniques are based on traditional one-time pad and secret sharing steps.
Note that for m = 2 the problem is trivial, the party with XOR function can always recover the other input.
Proof: We start by the converse. To show that
, since increasing the number of parties only increases the randomness required by the protocol.
Clearly, since P 3 has input X 3 , we have ρ(∅, ∅,
Denote by A 1 all the information that was exchanged between P 1 and P 3 throughout the protocol, and denote by A 2 all the information that was exchanged between P 2 and P 3 throughout the protocol.
From the accuracy requirement, we have H(X 1 ⊕ X 2 |A 1 , A 2 ) = 0, in addition to this, from the security requirement on P 3 , we have H(X 1 |A 1 , A 2 ) = 1 and H(X 2 |A 1 , A 2 ) = 1, which is equivalent to
From the security requirement on P 1 and P 2 , we have
Finally, from the independence of the inputs
Since A 1 and A 2 are only a part of all information transmitted and received,
We now show that the last term is more than 1. We have
(9) follows by (6) and (7), because
and (10) follows by (5) because X 2 and (A 1 , A 2 ) are independent, so in particular, X 2 and A 2 are independent. With the same argument, we notice that (4) implies H(X 1 |A 1 ) = 1. Finally, (11) follows by (3) and (4) because
and with (5)
We now move to the direct part. The achievability of the lower bound is obtained with the following protocol. Consider a multi-party computation protocol for X 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ X m . Let A 1 , ..., A m−1 be information that P m receives during the protocol from P 1 , ..., P m−1 , respectively. 1) P 1 draws a random number Z ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and sends
B. The real summation function
Note that for m = 2 the problem is trivial, the party with the summation can always recover the other input.
Proof: The upper bound of the randomness is shown by the achievability. Consider a multi-party computation protocol for X 1 + · · · + X m . Let A 1 , ..., A m−1 be information that P m receives during the protocol from P 1 , ..., P m−1 , respectively. 1) P 1 draws a random number Z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} uniformly at random and sends Z to P m , Y 2 = Z + X 1 mod m to P 2 . 2) For k ∈ {2, ..., m − 1}, P k receives Y k from P k−1 , computes the addition in modulo m
and sends Y k+1 to P k+1 .
3) P m receives Y m from P m−1 and computes the addition and subtraction in modulo m
In this example, 
While showing that log 2 (m) is necessary is not established, we believe that a logarithmic bound in m can be obtained with similar argument as for the XOR function. In particular, this can be written as an inequality over entropic vectors, for which Shanon-type inequalities may or may not suffice. Remark 1. While this paper focuses on summation functions, similar methods can be used for multiplications. Consider for example the case where three parties wish to compute (X 1 X 2 , X 1 X 2 , X 1 X 2 ), i.e., the product of the first two parties' bits. This can be achieved with a protocol requiring 4 bits of randomness. One possibility is two break each number into three shares, two of which being uniformly distributed, i.e., X 1 = X 1 (1) + X 1 (2) + X 1 (3) and X 2 = X 2 (1) + X 2 (2) + X 2 (3), and requiring party P 1 and P 2 to exchange all the bits X i (j) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and to provide the bit X 1 (3), X 2 (3) to party 3. Then each party has a component of the product X 1 X 2 which can be transmitted to P 3 for the function computation.
IV. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS SECURE MULTIPARTY

COMPUTATIONS
We now define a probabilistic model for the parties' inputs, and leverage the correlations among these inputs to obtain protocols which are secure with high probability in the limit of large sequences, without requiring private communication channels between all parties. 
• [Asymptotic security] Each party P i cannot recover the input of another party, i.e., for any j = i, there is no functionX
Note that the above definition of security is weaker than its counter-part in the one-shot setting by more than just its asymptotic nature: it is not forbidden to just leak some information, but to actually recover an input sequence.
Given a set of functions {f n (1) , . . . , f n (m) }, our goal is to study for which distributions µ on F m 2 it is possible to obtain a protocol computing the functions accurately and securely in the above asymptotic sense.
A. The XOR function
In this section, we introduce an asymptotically accurate and secure protocol for the modulo-2 sum of three parties inputs. Namely f
Definition 5. Let X and Y be binary random variables with a joint distribution µ on F 2 2 . We call the distribution additivelycorrelated if
Let X, Y, Z be binary random variables with a joint distribution µ on F 
This provides an achievability result.
Remark 2. The ASP protocol is based on polar codes. The linearity of the code is crucial to compute the XOR function. The protocol could probably be adapted with other linear codes, such as random linear codes, however, polar codes provide in addition a low-complexity protocol, and are also insightful as a proof technique. We next recall the source polarization results and then describe the protocol.
B. Preliminaries on polar codes
For n a power of 2, define G n = 1 0 1 1
, where A ⊗k denotes the matrix obtained by taking k Kronecker products of matrix A with itself.
, where n is a power of 2, and letX
where H(X j |X j−1 ) represents the conditional Shannon entropy ofX j givenX
Theorem 1 says that, except for a vanishing fraction, all conditional entropies H(X j |X j−1 ) tend to either 0 or 1. Also, notice that since G n is invertible, hence nH(p) = H(X n ) = H(X n ), and defining
we have
where H(p) is the entropy of the Bernoulli(p) distribution. Note that R ε,n (X) should be written R ε,n (p): it is not a function of a random variable but X, but here X stands for the marginal distribution of X n . This notation will be handy below. Since R ε,n (X) contains all the non-deterministic components ofX n , it is possible to reconstructX n fromX[R ε,n (X)] with a vanishing probability of error. This requires setting ε small enough, in particular one can chose ε = O(2 −n β ), β < 1/2. With polar codes, one can addition obtain an efficient decoding algorithm which runs in O(n log(n)).
C. The asymptotically secure polar (ASP) protocol
All the parties know µ and set ε = ε n = 2 −n 0.49 . Since µ is additively-correlated, assume w.l.o.g that the inputs of P 1 and P 2 are additively-correlated.
1) Inputs at time 0: party 1: X n , party 2: Y n , party 3: Z n . 2) At time 1:
3) At time 2:
using the polar decoding algorithm in [3] . LetX n ⊕Ŷ n be the decoded vector.
n . 5) At time 4: P 3 sendsX n ⊕Ŷ n + Z n to P 1 and P 2 .
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1. The SPC protocol is asymptotically accurate.
Proof: Since Z n is not encoded during the protocol, it is enough to prove that
This is a direct application of Theorem 1, as in [3] .
Lemma 2.
The SPC is asymptotically secure.
Proof: Since P 1 receives only X n ⊕ Y n ⊕ Z n during the protocol, it is clear that it cannot estimate Y n or Z n with a vanishing error probabilities. Similarly, P 2 cannot estimate X n or Z n with a vanishing error probability. Therefore, to prove that the protocol 2 is asymptotical secure for all parties, it is enough to prove that for P 3 ,
where a n ≫ 0 means lim inf n→∞ a n > 0, and
whereX n andŶ n are P 3 's estimations of X n and
During the protocol,
and knows X n ⊕ Y n with the vanishing error probability by Theorem 1. Thus, for P 3 , knowing X n with the vanishing error probability guarantees recovery of
, and vice verse. Then,
Therefore, it is enough to show P r(X n ,Ŷ n = X n , Y n ) ≫ 0. Notice that
n forms a Markov chain. Then, by Fano's inequality,
where (24) follows from (19). Then, since X n and Y n are additively-correlated,
Remark 3. Note that since the ASP protocol is asymptotically secure, it must be that H(X, Y ) − 2H(X ⊕ Y ) > 0 implies H(X)−H(X ⊕Y ) > 0 and H(Y )−H(X ⊕Y ) > 0. The reason for that is due to the nested property of source polar codes, see for example [1] , which implies that if H(X +Y ) > H(X), then R ε,n (X + Y ) contains R ε,n (X) and hence observingX n [R ε,n (X + Y )] allows to decode X n correctly. In fact the above implication is true since
and H(X|X + Y ) ≤ H(X).
V. OPEN PROBLEMS Concerning the first part, it would interesting to set conjecture 1. We believe that a logarithmic bound can be obtained with the approach of this paper. As mentioned in Remark 1, it is possible to obtain achievability results on ρ for multivariate polynomials. The scaling of the ρ can then be analyzed. For the second part, it would be interesting to establish converse results for XOR function, and any result for other type of functions, starting perhaps with the real-addition.
